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DO BOARD CHARACTERISTICS DRIVE FIRM PERFORMANCE? AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
Abstract 
The aim of our research is to analyze how board characteristics influence firm performance. 
In this paper, we specifically examine how board size, board independence, CEO duality, 
female directors and board compensation affect firm performance in a sample of international 
firms. The final panel data sample is composed of 10,314 firm-year observations belonging to 
34 countries that have been grouped into six geographic zones: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin 
America, North America and Oceania. Drawing on agency theory and dependence resource 
theory, we posit five hypotheses. The results show that some board characteristics, such as 
board size, board independence and having a female director, are positively associated with 
firm performance, whereas CEO duality, contrary to our expectations, also impacts positively 
on firm performance. Moreover, board compensation is not associated with firm performance. 
Tobin’s Q was used to measure firm performance, although an accounting measure was also 
employed for robustness analyses and to provide more validity to our results.  
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1. Introduction  
Corporate governance refers to the procedures and processes according to which 
organizations are directed and controlled by their CEO, board of directors and senior 
management. The literature highlights the fact that the board of directors is an important and 
highly effective internal mechanism of corporate governance and fulfills two important 
functions in companies: supervision of executive management in representation of the 
shareholders and providing business resources and assessment. In their supervisory role, the 
boards use their time and resources to monitor firm performance and the behavior of the 
executive managers.  
The theoretical basis of the supervisory function of the board is derived from agency 
theory, which highlights the possible conflicts of interest that may arise from the separation of 
ownership and control in companies (Jensen and Meckling 1976). According to Fama and 
Jensen (1983), agency theory views the board of directors as an essential element of the 
control mechanism to ensure that the problems resulting from the principal and agent 
relationship are controlled. This theory is the theoretical framework adopted by most research 
on corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
In addition to this theory, and in accordance with resource dependence theory, boards 
of directors help companies improve their performance by reducing their dependence on the 
external environment and contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This theory maintains 
that the board of directors is an essential link between the firm and the external resources that 
a firm requires to maximize its performance (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). According to these 
theories, an effective corporate governance system increases confidence in the company and 
therefore attracts investment and talent, which in turn can result in a better firm performance. 
For Hsu and Wu (2014), interest in issues regarding board characteristics has 
increased in recent years due to corporate fraud, corporate misconduct, negligence and 
massive loss of shareholders’ wealth, with corporate scandals in different multinational 
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companies being especially relevant. This has made it a priority issue for both researchers and 
policy makers. In this sense, previous studies have documented how certain board 
characteristics, such as board independence (Brown and Caylor, 2006) or size (Jackling and 
Johl, 2009; Cheng, 2008), among others, influence firm performance. These research studies 
have mainly addressed a single country (e.g. Australia, Japan, UK), and therefore it is 
considered necessary to advance the knowledge of how certain board characteristics influence 
firm performance considering countries with different institutional environments. 
Therefore, this paper aims to extend the debate outlined above and contribute to the 
existing literature in several ways. In the first place, we wished to analyze how certain board 
characteristics, such as board size, board independence, CEO duality, existence of female 
directors and board compensation or remuneration can influence firm performance and find 
out whether the results obtained are in line with previous findings according to the theories 
being taken into account: agency theory and resource dependence theory. 
Secondly, previous studies have focused mainly on specific time periods and on a 
sample of firms operating in a specific country, such as Australia, Japan and UK (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Ullah ,2017; Weir and Laing, 2001; Chang et al., 2015), while a few papers, 
as far as we know, have drawn on a sample of several countries (e.g. Fauver et al., 2017, 
Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Kim and Lu, 2013; Iliev et al., 2015). Our paper also employs 
an unbalanced panel dataset of 10,314 firm-year observations within 34 countries and 9 
economic sectors for the period 2004-2015. By including firms in countries with different 
institutional environments, we increase the heterogeneity of the dependent variables and, 
therefore, also the robustness and generalization of the results. Moreover, the availability of 
data from several countries adds special interest to our analysis, since it allows the analysis to 
be extended to a broader point of reference than the corporate system addressed in most of the 
existing studies. In this regard, the firms in our sample can be split up between common and 
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civil law countries, which have different characteristics (Fauver et al. 2017; Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013; La Porta et al. 1998). Civil law systems are more oriented to protect the 
government and creditors’ interests, companies get financial support from financial entities, 
there is a low legal protection of shareholder’s rights, capital markets are less liquid and 
ownership is highly concentrated. In contrast, common law systems are more oriented to 
shareholders, companies get funding from capital market because they are more liquid and 
ownership is more dispersed. Furthermore, while in civil law countries the conflict of interests 
arise between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, in common law countries 
these conflicts are between managers, including CEO, and shareholders.  
In the third place, we wished to check whether board characteristics affect firm 
performance equally, since previous studies have shown that some of them, such as board 
size, have a positive effect (e.g., Jackling and Johl 2009; Guest 2009; Kiel and Nicholson 
2003), while other characteristics do not maintain such an obvious relationship. Independent 
directors, for example, can have a significant positive influence on the value creation 
activities of the company and, therefore, on its performance through its strategic decision-
making (Gabrielsson 2007). In the case of women on the board, different studies have also 
found a positive relationship with firm performance (e.g. Liu et al., 2013; Kılıç and Kuzey 
2016; Terjesen et al., 2016). In contrast, with other board characteristics, such obvious results 
have not been obtained, especially in the case of CEO duality, where several authors such as 
Corbetta and Salvato (2004) and Song et al. (2006) obtained the opposite results to those they 
had raised in their hypotheses, since the hypotheses had been formulated in negative terms, 
whereas CEO duality was found to have a positive effect on firm performance. For board 
compensation and firm performance, the relationship has not always been positive. Thus, 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that board compensation was not related to firm 
performance. Similar results were obtained by other authors, such as Larcker et al. (2007) and 
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Jeppson et al. (2009). Thus, this paper aims to extend the debate outlined above and 
contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, we analyze how certain board 
characteristics, such as board size, CEO, duality, female directors and board compensation or 
remuneration can influence firm performance and check whether the results obtained are in 
line with the previous results according to the theories developed: agency theory and resource 
dependence theory. 
In addition, a contribution is made to the supervision and control function performed 
by the board of directors, with agency theory and resource dependence theory being used to 
better understand this control function. 
This paper is structured into the following sections. After the introduction, the 
theoretical framework and the hypotheses are presented in section two. In the third section, 
we present the methodology used and the sample and the variables are described. In the fourth 
section, the results obtained in this research are analysed and, finally, in the last section, the 
conclusions and the implications derived from our analysis are presented. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses  
The area of board characteristics and their link to firm performance has been of 
increasing interest in recent years. One of the most plausible explanations is based on agency 
theory, such that given the separation of ownership and control, corporate governance 
becomes a way of reducing agency costs. In this regard, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Fama and Jensen 1983) upholds that the main goal of the principal (shareholder) is to 
maximize firm value and obtain maximum firm performance, and thus they delegate this task 
to the agent (manager), who is assumed to be rational, individualist, risk-averse and effort-
averse, and therefore his or her objectives may be contrary to those of the principal. Since the 
structure of the board of directors (the principal) and its possible relation to firm performance 
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(represented by the manager-agent) is what informs our research, it can be said that agency 
theory is at the foundation of the present study.  
Although agency theory has been a very popular approach for previous empirical 
studies examining the impact of various board characteristics on firm performance, these 
studies have reported mixed and often contradictory results. (e.g., Hutchinson and Gul 2004; 
Jensen and Murphy 2004). A plausible explanation for these inconclusive results is that the 
agency theory-based studies have focused only on the monitoring function of the boards and 
ignored the resources that boards of directors provide to companies. Therefore, the application 
of other theories such as resource dependence theory is important.  
According to resource dependence theory, boards help companies improve their 
performance by reducing their dependence on the external environment and contingencies 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), thereby lowering their transaction costs, which may 
fundamentally assist their survival. From a resource dependence perspective, it can be 
similarly argued that a larger board brings greater opportunity for more links and hence access 
to resources. Other authors, such as Zahra and Pearce (1989), argue that when a firm 
designates a member to the board, it expects the directors to use their knowledge, skills and 
experience to provide useful counsel to the company, improve its legitimacy and reputation 
and support the firm’s capabilities for strategic assessment and implementation (Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003). 
Although the agency theory and dependence resource theory are accepted in the 
supervision, control and reputation function performed by the board of directors, there is still 
no unanimity as to the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance. Kiel 
and Nicholson (2003) state that, in general, there is a lack of consistent evidence of the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance, and in fact many of the results 
are contradictory (Kim 2005). In this regard, some authors have determined that there is a 
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positive relationship between board characteristics and firm performance, while another set of 
papers documents a negative relationship (Abdo and Fisher, 2007). Moreover, authors such as 
Dalton and Dalton (2011), among others, conclude that board attributes do not influence firm 
performance.  
From the review of the literature and individually for each of the variables, different 
results are obtained. Thus, for board size authors such as McIntyre et al. (2007), for 
companies in Canada, a positive relationship between this characteristic and firm performance 
is obtained, the same as Kiel and Nicholson (2003) for companies in Australia or Reddy et al. 
(2010) for New Zealand companies. In contrast, other studies addressing other countries 
obtain a negative relationship. This is the case of the works carried out by Dey and Chauhan 
(2009), Guest (2009) and O’Connell and Cramer (2010) for India, England and Ireland 
respectively. 
Another board characteristic studied in previous research is board independence, 
where the results obtained have also been mixed. Lin et al. (2009) for companies in China, 
O’Connell and Cramer (2010) for companies in Ireland and Mura (2007) for companies in the 
UK obtain positive results. Stanwick and Stanwick (2010) for companies in Canada and 
Bhagat and Black (2002) for companies in United States obtain negative results and other 
studies found no relation, such as those carried out by Dey and Chauhan (2009), Lehn et al. 
(2009), Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) for companies from India, the United States and Japan, 
respectively. The results obtained for CEO duality have also been diverse. A positive relation 
is obtained by Kota and Tomar (2010) for companies in India, and Elsayed (2007) in Egypt, a 
negative relation was found for Nigeria (Ehikioya 2009) and Russia (Judge et al.) and no 
relation was obtained by Baliga and Moyer (1996) for the United States or Lin et al. (2009) 
for China. 
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In the case of female directors, we can also find different results depending on the 
countries analyzed. Carter et al. (2003) found for United States companies that the proportion 
of women on boards has a positive influence on firm performance. The same occurs with 
firms in Denmark (Smith et al., 2006). However, other research conducted in Sweden (Du 
Rietz and Henrekson, 2000) and Norway (Randöy et al., 2006) finds that female directors do 
not influence firm performance, and therefore the results obtained so far are not conclusive. 
As regards board compensation, Firth et al. (1995), for Norway, find a positive 
relationship between board compensation and firm performance and in Germany, Andreas et 
al. (2012) obtain a positive relationship for a sample of 928 German listed companies as well. 
A review of the literature thus shows that much of the research on this topic has only 
taken a single country into consideration. Hence, there is importance in continuing with this 
line of research in the context of more than one country and proposing different hypotheses in 
order to advance in the determination of this relationship in the framework of the agency and 
resource dependence theories. 
2.1. Board size 
The first factor we analyze is board size. Board size refers to the total number of 
directors that can influence the corporate governance practices of companies and, as a 
consequence, their performance (Yermack 1996). Given that the strategic decisions of the 
firm are taken by the board, its characteristics can affect the decision-making process (Fodio 
and Oba 2012). Moreover, board size is an important dimension of the board structure (Noor 
and Fadzil 2013) and can be used as a proxy for the efficiency of the board of directors (Jia 
and Zhang 2013). In general, it may be thought that larger boards are more inefficient because 
agreements are more difficult to reach, owing to multiple interests (Brown et al., 2006). 
However, one can also consider that an increase in the number of members will bring 
different personal characteristics that can help to link the organization with its external 
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environment and ensure critical resources, including prestige and legitimacy, since with more 
members, there will be a greater wealth and variety of opinions and experiences and an 
increase in the supervisory capacity of the board (Mintzberg 1993, Pearce and Zahra 1992).  
In this regard, the agency and resource dependence approaches seem to support the 
idea that the larger the board, the more efficient it will be. According to agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), boards with a large number of directors are considered to be more 
effective in handling and controlling management; therefore, in terms of the agency problem, 
a greater number of directors involved in management activities will make the board more 
vigilant. The agency theory focuses precisely on the supervisory and control function of the 
board of directors (Gul and Leung 2004; Hutchinson and Gul 2004; Jermias 2007; Tsui et al. 
2001). Furthermore, resource dependence theory suggests that large and diversified boards are 
more likely to contribute the knowledge capital of the business sector in a deeper way, which 
can later influence the quality of strategic decision-making and, in the end, have a positive 
impact on performance (Arosa et al. 2010). In short, board size is an essential link between 
the company and the external resources that it needs to maximize its performance (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). 
Therefore, drawing on agency theory, resource dependence theory and past evidence 
(e.g., Jackling and Johl 2009; Guest 2009; Kiel and Nicholson 2003), it seems that there is a 
positive relationship between board size and firm performance. This positive relation seems to 
derive from the fact that when the board of directors has more members, there will be a 
greater wealth and variety of opinions and experiences and an increase in the supervisory 
capacity of the board, at the same time that more bonds will be formed between the company 
and its surroundings, thus facilitating the obtaining of resources that have a favourable impact 
on the creation of value for the company and, ultimately, on firm performance (Guest 2009). 
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Other authors, such as Coles et al. (2008), also obtain a positive relationship for a 
sample of 8,165 firm-year observations. Their study obtains a positive association between 
firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and board size in the context of large companies, 
which indicates that a large board size helps improve the overall performance of companies. 
For companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (Pakistan), Singh et al. (2018) also show 
a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
Considering the above, Lehn et al. (2009) conclude that board size should be related to 
the size of the company and its growth opportunities and, therefore should not be set based on 
a specific size recommended by a standard. Therefore, the board must have a size suitable for 
facilitating decision-making and reducing the costs of its operation, guaranteeing diversity of 
criteria adapted to business needs (Pucheta-Martínez 2015). According to the results obtained 
in previous investigations, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between board size and firm 
performance 
2.2. Board independence 
Independent directors are professionals without any relation to the management of the 
company, so they are unlikely to interfere in corporate decisions with their personal opinions 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Independent directors are a relevant control mechanism for 
companies because they make more objective decisions than managers and shareholders and 
provide new points of view different from the more traditional points of view, which are more 
focused on financial issues (Zahra and Stanton, 1988). In fact, Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) 
suggest that independent directors usually care about all stakeholders, given that most firms 
are less likely to retain useful information for their stakeholders. Furthermore, independent 
directors are more interested in guaranteeing the appropriate behaviour of firms and the 
fulfilment of the established goals. Thus, it is expected that independent directors will be 
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more objective and independent when assessing the firms’ management and behaviour than 
executive directors (Sonnenfeld, 1981).  
In this regard, agency theory argues that boards with a high proportion of independent 
directors are more effective in governing, handling and controlling management (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jizi et al. 2014; Fernández-Gago et al. 2016). In the 
same vein, Volonte (2015) indicates that independent directors reduce agency conflicts as 
they act as an effective oversight mechanism for the board and are more likely to protect the 
interests of shareholders. Furthermore, according to resource dependence theory, independent 
directors can have a significant positive influence on the value creation activities of the 
company and, therefore, on its performance through its strategic decision-making 
(Gabrielsson 2007). 
Dalton et al. (1998) claim that independent directors provide experience and 
objectivity. Furthermore, they highlight some reasons which may justify the presence of 
independent directors on boards, such as (a) their implication in correcting unbalanced powers 
and agency problems, (b) their interest in improving the corporate governance quality of firms 
and in guaranteeing the social interest in the decision-making process and, finally, (c) their 
commitment to providing an effective monitoring role of managers.  
Regarding the relationship between independent directors and firm performance, the 
results obtained in the previous literature shows a positive association. Dahya and McConnell 
(2007), who investigated the impact of board independence on firm performance for a sample 
of companies in the United Kingdom, find that companies that incorporate independent or 
external directors on their boards exhibit a significant improvement in their performance. In 
addition, for a sample of companies from the same country, Weir et al. (2002) found that 
board independence positively influences performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. Other 
research conducted in other countries by different authors also obtains positive results in the 
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relationship between independent directors and firm performance. In this sense, Coles et al. 
(2001) suggest with their research that a greater proportion of independent directors improves 
the control and strategic decision-making processes of the board through better tracking, and 
Ritchie (2007), Masulis et al. (2012) find a positive association when measuring the result in 
terms of Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA. 
Hence, drawing on agency theory and resource dependence theory, a higher presence 
of external or independent directors can lead to a greater increase in the internal control of the 
company, a greater disclosure of information as well as a more effective search for actions 
and decisions that protect shareholders. Accordingly, we predict a positive relationship 
between board independence and firm performance, proposing the following hypothesis:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the proportion of 
independent directors on boards and firm performance 
2.3. CEO duality 
CEO duality refers to the situation when the CEO also occupies the position of 
Chairperson (control) of the board of directors, resulting in a concentration of managerial 
power (Rechner and Dalton 1991; Surroca and Tribo 2008). For authors such as Jensen 
(1986), the concentration of power in one person increases the risk that he or she can develop 
strategies that favour their personal interests to the detriment of the company, since they may 
give rise to opportunistic actions and deplete the efficiency of the board, which would have a 
negative effect on business performance.  
Within the frame of the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), firms should 
divide the roles of CEO and Chairperson to avoid a concentration of power in the hands of a 
single person. Considering this theory, Goyal and Park (2002) and Hashim and Devi (2009) 
argue that the separation of the roles of Chairperson and CEO is preferable in order to avoid a 
concentration of power in the hands of a single person and to provide an effective system of 
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controls and balances regarding the activities and performance of executive directors. In this 
same regard, Fosberg and Nelson (1999) have argued that the separation of the functions of 
management and control within a company reduces agency costs and leads to better firm 
performance. 
Authors such as Christensen et al. (2010), Dahya et al. (2009), Faleye (2007), Tuggle 
et al. (2010) and Singh et al. (2018) conclude that CEO duality is negatively associated with 
company profitability, since it prevents the board of directors from independently exercising 
its control function over management. This negative effect can also be due to the fact that 
duality facilitates the accumulation of power in the same person and gives rise to low-quality 
financial information, the manipulation of profits and the generation of opportunistic actions, 
as well as undermining the efficiency of the board of directors. Therefore, according to 
agency theory, CEO duality will negatively influence the outcome of the company, since 
according to this theory it is preferable to separate the roles of Chairperson and CEO to avoid 
a concentration of power in the hands of only one person. 
Previous research conducted in specific countries such as New Zealand (Prevost et al. 
2002), Canada (Bozec 2005; Jermias 2007), Hong Kong (Tsui et al. 2001) and the United 
States (Jermias and Gani 2014) have obtained evidence that CEO duality has a negative 
impact on firm performance. These results are in line with the recommendations made on 
corporate governance by the Business Roundtable (2012) concerning principles of corporate 
governance, or the Corporate Governance Code (2010) in the UK, which consider that the 
role of the CEO and Chairperson should be kept separate. Considering the results of previous 
research studies, we propose the following hypothesis:  




2.4. Female directors  
Another variable that we will analyze is the presence of women on boards of directors, 
a topic that in recent years has acquired special relevance. The two theories that support the 
idea that women contribute to a more effective board and better firm performance are agency 
theory and the resource dependency theory. 
Agency theory that postulates that female directors on boards are the ones that 
contribute a wider range of perspectives in decision-making, which increases the 
independence of the board while reducing agency costs and, as a consequence, the value of 
the company increases, all of which makes it one of the crucial theories used by academics to 
discuss the direct effect of female presence on the performance of the company (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). In this regard, agency theory assumes that female directors can act as a 
mechanism of supervision and control of board activities (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). As an 
argument that can explain this premise, authors such as Solimene et al. (2017) argue that 
female directors have acquired high levels of education in recent years, such as Master’s 
degrees and other postgraduate studies and, therefore, are considered highly professional and 
experienced when making important decisions on the boards of directors.  
According to the resource dependency theory, female directors contribute unique and 
valuable resources and relationships to their boards as they are considered an essential link 
between the company, its environment and the external resources on which a company 
depends. It is a matter of capturing resources that improve the economic performance of the 
company thanks to the ties and contacts that female directors have with the environment 
(Hillman et al., 2007).  
Several authors (e.g., Gul et al., 2011) have argued that women play an important role 
in the field of business management, since women bring to their profession values and criteria 
that differ from those used by men. Authors such as Seierstad (2016) consider that the role of 
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female directors on boards is relevant for two reasons: one is due to the business model and 
the second is due to social justice. The first is based on the premise that having female 
directors on boards will contribute new skills that will in turn have an impact on improving 
firm performance; the second focuses on the need to establish heterogeneity on boards of 
directors in order to represent all the individuals on the teams. In this research, the first 
premise is the most appropriate one because we believe that women directors on boards can 
provide different points of view in decision-making processes compared to men, which can be 
very beneficial for business (Hoobler et al., 2016). 
The arguments presented and the theoretical framework derived from agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) and resource dependence theory seem to support the idea that a 
greater number of women on boards of directors will increase firm performance. The previous 
literature has also shown a positive effect of female directors on firm performance. For 
instance, in a sample of companies in the United States, Carter et al. (2003) find that the 
proportion of women on boards of directors has a positive influence on firm value measured 
by Tobin’s Q, concluding that diversity has a positive effect on firm performance. Other 
research, by Erhardt and Werbel (2003), also conducted for US companies, found that a 
greater degree of board diversity is associated with higher firm performance, measured on this 
occasion by return on assets (ROA) and return on capital investments. In addition, Konrad et 
al. (2008) found that the impact of women on boards is greater when there is more than one 
woman present on that board. In these cases, women feel stronger together and, as such, can 
have a stronger voice in the decision-making process, implying that they will also feel more 
valued. Other research conducted by different authors also found a positive relationship (e.g. 
Liu et al. 2013; Kılıç and Kuzey, 2016; Terjesen et al. 2016); hence, these studies provide 
strong evidence that it is better to have women on the board to be able to obtain better firm 
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performance. Considering the previously established arguments, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the presence of female 
directors on boards and firm performance 
2.5. Board compensation  
In recent years, board compensation or remuneration has become one of the most 
debated issues in the literature on board characteristics of corporate governance, especially 
when it comes to finding a balance between compensation systems that align the interests of 
principal and agent and, at the same time, distribute the risk between both figures. One of the 
theories on which board compensation relies is the agency theory, in that the idea is to 
develop a compensation package that makes it possible to attract, retain and motivate 
managers (Conyon 2006). Thereby providing management with an incentive toward better 
firm performance in such a way that it is possible to retain the manager, who is efficient or 
attract others who are even more efficient.  
Over the years, the compensation of board members has mainly consisted of a fixed 
compensation and small additional supplements, such as all expenses paid for meetings. 
However, the difficulties of the traditional remuneration systems, both fixed and short term, 
fail to solve the agency problems by not avoiding the short-term opportunistic behavior of the 
directors and, therefore, not aligning the interests of directors and shareholders, which has 
meant that variable and long-term remuneration systems are increasingly being used to favor 
both shareholders and board members (Murphy 1999). In short, and following Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), the compensation programs should be designed to motivate board members 
to select and implement actions that increase the wealth and value of the company and, 
therefore, firm performance. In this regard, Magnan et al. (2010) argue that board 
compensation should be high enough in order to attract competent and experienced directors 
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and to reward their duties. However, this remuneration should not be as high as impairing 
their independence, objectivity and judge. Board compensation should be determined in a 
transparent and objective way by considering the integration of the talent of directors and the 
corporate governance’s philosophy of a firm, and not should base on short-term goals because 
it may encourage speculative behaviours contrary to the long-term targets of firms.  
Diverse studies have been conducted to analyze the relationship between board 
compensation and firm performance. In this regard, Molonko (2004) reports that board 
compensation is positively associated with performance of a sample of Kenyan banks. The 
paper of Watson and Wilson (2005) supports the alignment role performed by board pay 
between managers and owners as suggested by agency theory, since their findings show that 
board compensation has a positive effect on firm performance. For Conyon (2006), linking 
board remuneration to firm performance should be considered fair for shareholders, since 
board members are rewarded based on their individual and firm performance. Andreas et al. 
(2012) provide evidence that board remuneration plays a relevant role as corporate 
governance mechanism, especially in companies where other corporate governance tools are 
weaker, by affecting positively firm performance. Consistent with this evidence, Müller et al. 
(2014) also show that board members well-rewarded perform better by enhancing firm 
performance and Handa (2018) documents that the relationship between board remuneration 
and bank performance is positive. Thus, based on above arguments, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 






3. Methodology, sample and variables 
3.1. Sample  
Our initial sample consisted of 13,179 international firm-year observations from 2004 
to 2015. We then excluded from this sample financial entities and companies for which all the 
data necessary for the analysis was not available, removing 2,865 companies in all. Thus, the 
final panel data sample was composed of 10,314 firm-year observations. The data (company-
related, economic, financial and corporate governance) used in this research come from the 
Thomson Reuters database, an international database that collects all fundamental data in 
reporting entities from all countries in targeted global indices (FTSE 100 index, S&P 500 
index, Dow Jones index, NIKKEI 225 index, Euro Stoxx index, CAC 40 index, IBEX 35, 
NASDAQ 100 index), among others. Our sample is unbalanced because during the period 
explored, not all firms are observed, given that some of them delisted because of acquisitions 
and mergers or because they went bankrupt, among other things. Financial entities were 
removed because they must comply with particular accounting rules and their supervision by 
financial authorities is stricter. Accordingly, it is more difficult to compare the annual 
financial statements of financial entities with those of the non-financial firms. The companies 
of the sample belong to 34 countries, shown in Table 1, where the observations by country 
and their frequencies are also provided. According to the figures in Table 1, the countries 
most represented are the United States with 33.50% of the companies in the sample, Canada 
with 10.20%, United Kingdom with 10% and Japan with 9.8%. In contrast, the countries with 
the fewest firms in the sample are Egypt, Greece and Israel with 0.1% and Jersey and Portugal 
with 0.2%. These countries have been classified into six big geographic areas in order to 
control regional effects: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America and Oceania. By 
including firms in regions with different institutional environments, we increase the 
robustness and generalization of the results. 
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Insert Table 1 
Corporate governance attributes vary greatly among countries. In this regard, in Table 
2 we provide some institutional dimensions, which characterise the corporate governance 
system of countries in our sample. Specifically, we analyse, drawing on the papers of La Porta 
et al. (1998) and Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), the legal origin, the legal rights’ strength, the 
creditors’ rights, the legal protection of minority shareholders, the disclosure requirements, 
the shareholders’ rights (one share, one vote) and the efficiency of judicial system. As 
appreciated in Table 2, concerning the legal origin of the countries in our sample, almost 35% 
of them are located in common law systems, while 65% are domiciled in civil law systems. 
Additionally, the majority of common law countries in our sample tend to have, on average, 
strong formal legal rights, particularly some countries in Asia, Oceania, Europe, North 
America and South Africa, in comparison to civil law countries, where have, on average, a 
medium level of formal legal rights, mainly countries from European and Scandinavian 
contexts. Some countries form Latin America and African show weak formal rights. The 
creditors’ rights tend to be stronger in common law countries than in civil law countries, 
although the differences between them are not very significant showing, on average, an 
intermediate level of creditors’ rights. Regarding the legal protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights, it can be appreciated that it is higher in common law systems than civil 
law systems, where it tends to be low. The disclosure requirements in common and civil law 
countries are consistent with the level of legal protection of minority shareholders’ rights, 
except for some countries in both systems. The judicial efficiency in both common and civil 
law countries is similar, although it tends to be a little stronger in common law systems. 
Finally, it is observed in Table 2 that the shareholders’ right –one share, one vote- prevails in 
civil law countries in contrast to common law, where it is hardly considered.  
Insert Table 2 
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The companies in the sample operate in nine industry sectors, which are shown in 
Table 3. In this analysis, we used the TRBC economic sector classification supplied by 
Thomson Reuters. Consistent with the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), our 
industry classification is a market-based classification. As can be observed in Table 2, 20.70% 
of the companies in our sample operate in the industrial sector, 18.88% in consumer cyclical, 
13.25% in basic materials and 10.76% in energy. In contrast, the telecommunications services 
sector represents 3.82%, the lowest proportion.  
Insert Table 3 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
In line with past research (e.g., Carter et al. 2010; Vafaei et al. 2015; Kalsie and 
Shrivastav 2016; Hoffman 2014; García-Ramos et al. 2017), we use Tobin’s Q as proxy for 
calculating our dependent variable, firm performance. Most researchers who employ Tobin’s 
Q to measure firm performance use Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approximation, which is 
calculated as the market value of a firm’s common stock + the liquidating value of preferred 
stock + the book value of debt divided by the total assets (Jiang et al. 2015). 
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
The first independent variable used is board size, labelled as B_SIZE and measured as 
the total number of board members. Board independence (B_INDEP) is the second 
independent variable employed, calculated as the ratio between the total number of 
independent members on boards and the total number of board members. The third 
independent variable is CEO duality (CEO_DUALITY), measured as a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 when the Chairperson of the board serves simultaneously as CEO and 0, 
otherwise. The presence of women directors on boards is the fourth independent variable 
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considered in this analysis, denoted by FEM_DIR and computed as the ratio between the total 
number of female directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards. Finally, 
board compensation is the fifth independent variable used, labelled as B_COMPENSATION 
and measured as the log of board compensation, which is the total compensation paid to all 
board members.  
 
3.2.2. Control variables  
Several control variables have been taken into account. Board meetings 
(B_MEETING) is the first control variable considered, measured as the number of meetings 
held by boards every year. In line with prior research (e.g. Zhu et al. 2016; Mishra and Kapil 
2018), we also expect a positive association between board meetings and firm performance. 
The second control variable included in the model is firm size, SIZE, calculated as the log of 
total assets (Kong and Kong 2017; Tyagi et al. 2018). We predict a positive effect of firm size 
on firm value, consistent with Palaniappan (2017a), who show that company size positively 
affects firm performance.  
The leverage of firms has also been considered as a control variable. The leverage is 
denoted by LEVERAGE and is measured as the ratio between firm debt and total assets. We 
expect a negative effect of leverage on firm value, since firms with more debt are more likely 
to perform worse. Authors such as Tsuruta (2017) and Vieira (2017) provide evidence on the 
negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and firm performance. Another control 
variable used is capital intensity, labelled as CAPITAL_INTENSITY and computed as the 
ratio between firm long-term or fixed assets and total assets. Previous research shows mixed 
findings about the impact of capital intensity on firm value. Jorgenson and Vu (2005) and 
Bernard and Jensen (2007) report a better firm performance when capital intensity increases, 
while Lee and Qu (2011) demonstrate a non-linear association, concretely quadratic, between 
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capital intensity and firm value, concluding that as the capital intensity of companies 
increases, firm performance decreases, but beyond a certain threshold, more capital intensity 
results in a higher firm value. Thus, we expect that firm performance can be positively or 
negatively affected by capital intensity. Ownership concentration is also another control 
variable considered. This variable is labeled as OWNSHIP_CON and is measured as the 
average percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in 
each country, in line with Eklund and Desai (2013). As Maury and Pajuste (2005) and 
Boerkamp (2016) suggest, a high ownership concentration will negatively affect firm 
performance since dominant shareholders will use their decision power for their own benefit, 
in contrast with the interests of minority shareholders. Dual-class stocks has been also 
controlled, denoted by DUAL_CLASS and calculated as a dummy variable that codes the 
value 1 if companies have dual-class stocks (class A/B or registered/bearer shares) and 0, 
otherwise. Dual-class stocks imply that firms have two different classes of stocks, which vary 
voting rights, dividend payments or other characteristics. We expect a negative association 
between dual-class shares and firm performance, consistent with Zhang (2002). Another 
control variable considered is the operating performance, labelled as 
OPERATING_PERFORM. This variable is measured as the ratio between operating income 
and total assets, in line with Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), who show a positive association 
between operating performance and firm performance. The sector in which firms operate has 
also been included as a control variable (Shehata et al. 2017). We use the TRBC economic 
sector classification supplied by Thomson Reuters. This variable is labelled as SECTORS, 
and is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operates in the sector 
analyzed and 0, otherwise. We employ the following 9 sectors: basic materials, consumer 
cyclical, consumer non-cyclical, energy, healthcare, industrials, technology, 
telecommunication services and utilities. The regional effect has been also controlled by using 
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six geographic zones: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America and Oceania. This 
variable is defined as REGIONS and is measured as a dummy variable that will be code 1 if 
the country of the sample belongs to the region explored and 0, otherwise. Finally, year 
effects (YEARt) are also controlled by considering a set of dummy variables. In Table 4, we 
show a description of all variables used in this research.  
Insert Table 4 
3.3. Model 
Below, we provide the model estimated to check our hypotheses: 
Q_TOBIN it = β0 + β1B_SIZEit+ β2B_INDEPit+ β3CEO_DUALITYit+ β4 FEM_DIRit+ 
β5B_COMPENSATIONit+ β6B_MEETINGit +β7SIZEit +β8LEVERAGEit 






∑ βj YEARt + Ʊi + θit 
 
Where the individual effect Ʊi represents each company, but it does vary over time, 
while θit differs over time among companies. Our panel data model was estimated with pooled 
OLS regressions with corrected (clustered) standard errors in order to control for firm-fixed 
effects (e.g., Rogers, 1993; Williams, 2000). 
 
4. Analysis of results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations  
In Table 5, we offer the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this analysis. 
As can be observed, the Q_TOBIN ratio of international firms, on average, is 0.57 (median: 
0.58; minimum: 0.07 and maximum: 2.29), in line with Kiel and Nicholson (2003), who 
obtained a Tobin’s Q value of 0.13. Board size (B_SIZE) is, on average, 10.61 board 
25 
members, board independence (B_INDEP), on average, accounts for 63.67% and female 
directors (FEM_DIR) on boards represent, on average, 11.97%. CEO_DUALITY, that is, 
when the Chairperson of the board serves simultaneously as CEO of the firm, on average, 
accounts for 32.40% and board compensation (B_COMPENSATION) is 11.69 (measured as 
the log of board compensation). Companies’ boards (B_MEETING) meet, on average, 8.50 
times every year, firm size is 9.62 (measured as the log of total assets), the average level of 
leverage is 13.10% and capital intensity (CAPITAL_INTENSITY) accounts for 6.35%. The 
ownership concentration is, on average, 30.04% and the operating performance 13.74%. 
Furthermore, 13.15% of the firms have dual-class stocks. The sector in which firms operate 
are: BASIC MATERIALS accounts for 13.25%, CONSUMER CYCLICAL, 18.88%, 
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL, 9.66%, ENERGY, 10.76%, HEALTHCARE, 7.99%, 
INDUSTRIALS, 20.70%, TECHNOLOGY, 8.58%, TELECOMMNUCIATION SERVICES, 
3.82% and UTILITIES account for 6.32%. Finally, 0.70% of the countries of the sample are 
located in Africa, 15.31% in Asia, 30.70% in Europe, 2.49% in Latin America, 43.74% in 
North America and 7.07% in Oceania.  
Insert Table 5 
In Table 6, we show the correlation matrix in order to check whether there are 
multicollinearity concerns. According to the figures provided in Table 6, none of the 
correlation coefficients are greater than 0.80. As a result, we can confirm that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in our analysis.  
Insert Table 6 
4.2. Multivariate analysis  
In Table 7, we provide the findings of all models estimated. In Model 1, we analyse 
how board size affects firm performance, in Models 2 and 3, we examine the effect of board 
independence and CEO duality, respectively, on firm value and, finally, in Models 4 and 5, 
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we explore the impact of women directors on boards and board compensation on firm 
performance, respectively. In Model 6, we show the finding for all independent variables 
estimated in one model.  
Insert Table 7 
In Model 1, the variable board size (B_SIZE) has the expected sign and is statistically 
significant. Therefore, the first hypothesis is accepted, suggesting that board size in our 
sample of international firms has a positive effect on firm performance. In this regard, larger 
boards are more likely to enhance firm value. Our findings are consistent with Bhatt and 
Bhattacharya (2015) and Kalsie and Shrivastav (2016), who also demonstrate a positive 
association between board size and firm value. This evidence shows that board size in fact 
matters for companies since larger boards will positively affect firm value and, therefore, it 
will imply a higher wealth for shareholders. Boards with a high number of directors will 
provide human and social capital to the board, given that they might bring diverse past 
expertise, skills and professional backgrounds, as well as the knowledge of similar industries. 
This will be beneficial for the decision-making process. Additionally, it will be more 
complicated for CEOs or managers to pressure directors on a larger board. Thus, board size 
plays a significant role in supervising the management team and giving advice and counsel, in 
line with Klein (1998) or Singh et al. (2018), and this will have a positive impact on firm 
performance.  
Model 2 explores how board independence affects firm value. The variable proportion 
of independent directors on boards provides a positive sign, as expected, and is significant. As 
a result, the second hypothesis is accepted. This finding suggests that board independence is 
positively associated with firm performance. Authors such as Mak and Kusnadi (2005), 
Palaniappan (2017b) and Palmberg (2015), among others, also find that the presence of 
independent directors on boards influences firm value. Our evidence shows that independent 
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directors on boards may perform a relevant monitoring role by mitigating the power that 
managers and CEOs might have on the whole board because they are outsiders, external or 
non-executive directors. Independent directors usually defend the rights of shareholders, 
particularly minorities, given that they tend to be independent from managers and can better 
supervise them. In this regard, and according to Hanniffa and Cooke (2002), independent 
directors “are seen as a checks and balances” tool in improving board efficiency. Independent 
directors will be more likely to align shareholders and managers’ interests and needs. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argue the importance of the role performed by independent directors, 
because they these directors are available to provide valuable experience and professional 
background as well as ties or connections with external organizations, positively affecting 
corporate value. Thus, board independence will improve firm performance and safeguard 
shareholders’ wealth, interests and demands (Gabrielsson, 2007). 
In Model 3, we analyse the relationship between CEO duality and firm value. The 
variable CEO duality (CEO_DUALITY) shows a positive sign, contrary to our expectations, 
and is statistically significant. Hence, according to this finding, the third hypothesis has to be 
rejected. This evidence suggests that when the roles of Chairperson of the board and CEO of 
the company are combined, firm value is enhanced, in contrast with the findings of most past 
research (e.g., Jermias, 2007; Jermias and Gani, 2014), which reports that CEO duality results 
in poorer firm performance. Miller and Yang (2015), however, also show that CEO duality 
has a positive effect on corporate value. The arguments defining this positive relationship are 
centered on the fact that when the CEO and the Chairperson are the same person, power and 
control will be unified, thus avoiding the confusion of having two public spokespersons in the 
company, while the transmission of information will be improved and the coordination costs 
reduced, thus improving firm performance (Corbetta and Salvato 2004; Song et al. 2006). 
CEO duality implies a clear and higher authority in firms, which may drive companies to the 
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same strategic direction addressing conflicts and lack of coordination between senior 
managers and stakeholders, mainly shareholders. This will result in a more efficient decision-
making process and could lead to greater firm performance. The concentration of power in the 
CEO might be beneficial for firms to survive and be successful, in that the leadership will be 
more effective and have more legitimacy (e.g., Dalton et al. 1998). The positive impact of 
CEO duality on firm performance may also be explained by the fact that CEOs have specific 
knowledge of the firm, accumulating a lot of the firm’s internal knowledge and the 
knowledge of the uncertain environment and context in which firms operate, in addition to 
being aware of the competitive advantages and disadvantages of the firm and its competitors, 
since they daily manage firms. This could lead to better firm performance.  
Model 4 examines the relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance. The variable proportion of female directors on boards (FEM_DIR) offers a 
positive sign, as predicted, and is significant and, therefore, the fourth hypothesis has to be 
accepted. This result shows that the presence of women directors on boards is positively 
associated with firm value (e.g. Liu et al., 2013; Kılıç and Kuzey, 2016; Terjesen et al., 2016), 
hence these studies provide solid evidence that having women on the board can lead to better 
firm performance. 
Our finding suggests that the incorporation of a minority group on boards, such as 
female directors, may help represent and protect shareholders’ demands and interests (Webb 
2004) by showing objective and critical judgments in the decision-making process, which 
might result in a higher firm performance. Better firm performance can also be due to the 
greater board independence that female directors on boards provide since directors with more 
conventional backgrounds do not usually raise the questions that may come from directors of 
a different ethnicity, cultural background or gender, as Carter et al. (2003) argue. Likewise, 
females on boards may contribute a diversity of opinions and views to board discussions, 
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leading to more responsive policies, increasing more involvement in the decision-making 
process and encouraging more democratic decisions (Nielsen and Huse 2010; Webb 2004). 
All these qualities of female behaviour may also align the interests of all shareholders and, as 
a consequence, it can be assumed that female directors may help to avoid conflicts and make 
decisions that benefit shareholders, which might enhance corporate value.  
Finally, in Model 5, we analyze the impact of board compensation on firm value. The 
variable board compensation (B_COMPENSATION) shows a positive sign, in line with our 
predictions, but it is insignificant. According to this result, the fifth hypothesis has to be 
rejected, suggesting that well-paid board members do not have any effect on corporate value. 
In other words, board members with higher compensation will not have more incentives to 
monitor managers, which suggests that well-rewarded board members will not result in more 
supervising efforts and will not be more likely to converge their interests with those of 
shareholders. Our evidence does not support the agent-principal or agency approach, which 
argues the positive effect of board remuneration on company value.  
Model 6, where all independent variables are jointly estimated, reports the same 
results as all the independent variables are individually estimated. Thus, we reach the same 
conclusion both when independent variables are individually estimated, and when they are 
jointly estimated.  
Regarding the control variables, board meetings, size and capital intensity show the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. Thus, large firms whose boards tend to meet 
several times each year are positively correlated with firm value, while increases in capital 
intensity reduce firm performance. Furthermore, firms operating in countries characterized by 
high ownership concentration underperform. Contrary to our predictions, firms with high 
levels of operating performance also tend to reduce firm performance. Additionally, all the 
sectors analyzed exhibit a negative sign and are statistically significant, showing that firms 
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operating in all the sectors are more likely to underperform. The previous evidence regarding 
the repercussion of sector of activity on firm performance is not conclusive. In this regard, 
Jermias and Gani (2014), for a sample of US companies that they obtained from Compustat S 
& P 500, conclude that the activity sectors do not have an effect when analyzing the impact of 
board characteristics on firm performance. For Spanish companies, within the context of the 
influence of corporate governance on firm performance as well, Pucheta-Martínez (2015) 
obtains a negative but not significant relationship for some sectors, and a negative and 
significant relationship for others, such as the oil and energy sectors. Concerning the 
geographic zone, our findings show that firms operating in Europe and Latin America 
perform better, and in Oceania worse, in contrast to companies operating in North America. 
Moreover, firms operating in Asia with large boards and well-paid directors tend to perform 
worse than companies operating in North America. Finally, the remainder of the control 
variables are not significant.  
Additionally, endogeneity concerns have been also addressed. Although it is expected 
that board attributes (board size, board independence, CEO duality, board gender diversity 
and board compensation) affect firm value, it is also possible that over-performing companies 
will make up boards with certain characteristics regarding the board attributes explored in this 
analysis. To check for endogeneity, we estimated our models by lagging the independent 
variables, consistent with Ozkan (2007), who supports the idea that endogeneity problems 
might be reduced by lagging explanatory variables (independent variables). Our results, 
provide in Table 8, are in line with the findings shown in our base models when the 
independent variables are individually estimated. However, when all independent variables 
are jointly estimated, the board compensation variable exhibits a negative sign, contrary to 
our predictions, and is statistically significant, in comparison to the finding presented in Table 
7, where it was insignificant.  
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4.3. Robustness analysis  
We have conducted a robustness check in order to assess if our findings change in the 
presence of an alternative measure for firm performance. Concretely, we use as proxy variable 
for firm performance the ROE ratio (return on equity), measured as the ratio of net profit over 
total equity, following Matolcsy and Wright (2011) and Li et al. (2015). In Table 9, we offer 
the results of all our models, namely, estimating all independent variables individually and all 
together in one model. As can be appreciated, the findings corroborate the result of our 
baseline models. In addition, the board compensation variable shows a positive sign, as 
expected, and is significant, both when all independent variables are individually and jointly 
estimated, while in our baseline model, it was insignificant. Thus, ROE can be considered a 
robust measure for firm performance since it not only supports our core findings, but also the 
sign and significance of the board compensation variable.  
Insert Table 9 
5. Concluding remarks  
 In this research, we aim at exploring the relationship between certain corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Particularly, we analyze how board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, board gender diversity and board compensation affect firm 
performance using a sample of international firms. Drawing on agency and resource 
dependence theories, we hypothesized that all these board attributes are positively correlated 
with firm value, except CEO duality, for which we predicted a negative effect.  
 Our findings report, as expected, that large boards with a high presence of independent 
and female directors tend to increase firm value, supporting agency and resource dependence 
approaches, and in line with the monitoring or supervising hypothesis. On the other hand, the 
results show that CEO duality, contrary to our predictions, has a positive impact on firm 
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performance, and board compensation does not affect firm performance, also in contrast to 
our expectations. Thus, our evidence supports all the hypotheses posited, except those relating 
to CEO duality and board compensation. Certain board attributes, such as board size, board 
independence and board gender diversity are more likely to improve shareholder wealth and 
thus, shareholders might take them into account, especially potential investors. CEO duality 
implies a concentration of power in the CEO and, as a consequence, it was hypothesized that 
CEO duality might have a negative effect on firm performance since CEOs will be more 
interested in satisfying their needs and interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests. 
However, our results are not consistent with this idea and CEOs can make an effort to 
enhance corporate value, given that this may be beneficial for their success, legitimation and 
reputation, among other things.  
 This research has several implications. Firstly, the findings of this investigation 
focused on a sample of international firms suggest that particular board attributes such as 
board size, independent directors, CEO duality, female directors and board remuneration are 
relevant corporate governance mechanisms for improving firm performance. Thus, this 
evidence may be useful for managers who are willing to enhance their reputation and to gain 
legitimation by shareholders, stakeholders and society. Practitioners with a shareholders’ 
orientation should make up boards with these effective corporate governance mechanisms 
because they will be more likely to over perform firms. Secondly, our results also support the 
thesis that CEO duality does not always have a negative effect on business decisions, 
particularly firm performance. Therefore, this evidence should lead policymakers to consider 
the possibility of not reinforcing the separation of the figure of CEO and Chairperson of the 
board. Regulatory bodies have established recommendations or laws supporting the thesis of 
the positive benefits of different individuals holding the positions of CEO and Chairperson of 
the board, but our findings are contrary to this idea, since CEO duality improves firm 
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performance. Perhaps, it would be more prudent to assess the impact of CEO duality for each 
business decision in particular, and according to this evidence, regulate in a more precise way 
the dual role of Chairperson of the board and CEO. Thirdly, current shareholders and 
potential investors may benefit from our findings because they could be useful for making 
decisions about investments and about the most appropriate board structure for increasing 
corporate value. Most shareholders and potential investors are interested in increasing the 
probability of a return on their investments, in the short or long term, depending on their 
orientations and, therefore, they will be willing to form boards, which encourage better firm 
value. Finally, the findings of this study also suggest that more research is needed. 
Researchers may extend our study by examining the association between other corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance, which will be useful in shedding new light on 
what board composition or board structure is most suitable to make a well-performing 
company.  
 This research also is subject to several limitations. Firstly, it is possible that we have 
disregarded some factors that potentially affect firm performance, according to prior 
theoretical and empirical evidence. Secondly, we have explored all countries for which it has 
been possible to collect all data necessary for conducting this research. Future research 
extending the sample scope to more countries should be carried out. Finally, we use as 
dependent variable a market performance measure (Tobin’s Q), which limits this study to the 
scope of listed companies. This analysis may be extended to non-listed firms, particularly 
small and medium-sized enterprises, using other performance measures different from market 
ones.  
Future lines of research can be derived from this investigation. Firstly, it would be 
interesting to analyze the association between board attributes and firm value, differentiating 
between developing and emerging countries. Secondly, we would also encourage scholars to 
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explore which corporate governance mechanisms are most significant for enhancing corporate 
value in the banking industry, since our sample excludes this sector.  
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Table 1 
Number of observations by country 
Country  Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia 678 6.6 6.6 
Austria 29 0.3 6.8 
Belgium 74 0.7 7.6 
Brazil 126 1.2 8.8 
Canada 1058 10.2 19.0 
Chile 47 0.5 19.5 
China 261 2.5 22.0 
Denmark 93 0.9 22.9 
Egypt 11 0.1 23.0 
Finland 124 1.2 24.2 
France 448 4.3 28.5 
Germany 83 0.8 29.3 
Greece 9 0.1 29.4 
Hong Kong 110 1.1 30.5 
India 125 1.2 31.7 
Ireland 159 1.5 33.2 
Israel 6 0.1 33.3 
Italy 98 1.0 34.3 
Japan 1011 9.8 44.1 
Jersey 18 0.2 44.3 
Luxembourg 56 0.5 44.8 
Mexico 84 0.8 45.6 
Netherlands 183 1.8 47.4 
New Zealand 51 0.5 47.9 
Norway 47 0.5 48.4 
Portugal 25 0.2 48.6 
Russia 121 1.2 49.8 
South Africa 61 0.6 50.4 
Spain 156 1.5 51.9 
Sweden 178 1.7 53.6 
Switzerland 227 2.2 55.8 
Thailand 69 0.7 56.5 
United Kingdom 1035 10.0 66.5 
United States  3453 33.5 100.0 
Total  10,314 100  
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Table 2 
Corporate governance indicators 















Efficiency of judicial 
system 
Australia Common High Medium-high High High 0 High 
Austria Civil Medium-High Medium-high Low Low 0 High 
Belgium Civil Medium-High Low-medium Medium-high Low-medium 0 High 
Brazil Civil Low Low Low Low 1 Medium-high 
Canada Common Medium-high Low Medium-high High 0 High 
Chile Civil Low-medium Low-medium Medium-high Medium-high 1 High 
China Civil Low-medium Low-medium High Low-medium 1 n.a. 
Denmark Civil Medium-high Medium-high Low-medium Medium-high 0 High 
Egypt Civil Low Low-medium Low-medium Low-medium 0 Medium-high 
Finland Civil Medium-high Low Low-medium Low-medium 0 High 
France Civil Medium-high Low Low-medium High 0 High 
Germany Civil High Medium-high Low Low-medium 0 High 
Greece Civil Low Low Low Low-medium 1 Medium-high 
Hong Kong Common High High High High 1 High 
India Common High Low-medium Medium-high High 0 High 
Ireland Common High Low Medium-high Medium-high 0 High 
Israel Common High Medium-high High Medium-high 0 High 
Italy Civil Low Low-medium Low-medium Medium-high 0 Medium-high 
Japan Civil Medium-high Low-medium Low-medium High 1 High 
Jersey Common n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. 
Luxembourg Civil Medium-high n.a. Low n.a. 1 n.a. 
Mexico Civil Medium-high  Low Low Medium-high 0 Medium-high 
Netherlands Civil Medium-high Medium-high Low Low-medium 0 High 
New Zealand Common High High High Medium-high 0 High 
Norway Civil Medium-high Low-medium Low-medium Medium-high 0 High 
Portugal Civil Low Low Low-medium Low-medium 0 Medium-high 
Russia Civil Low Low-medium Low-medium n.a. 1 n.a. 
South Africa Common High Medium-high High High 0 Medium-high 
Spain Civil Medium-high Low-medium Low-medium Low-medium 0 Medium-high 
Sweden Civil Low-medium  Low Low-medium  Medium-high 0 High 
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Switzerland Civil High Low Low Medium-high 0 High 
Thailand Common Low-medium Low-medium High High 0 Low-medium 
United Kingdom Common High High High High 0 High 





Legal origin Common law country vs Civil law country 
Legal rights strength’s index Strength of legal rights index ranges between 0 and 10 
(0-3=Low, 3-5=Low-medium, 5-7= Medium-high, 7-10= High) 
Creditor rights’ index 
Creditor rights aggregate score ranges between 0 and 4 
(0-1=Low, 1-2=Low-medium, 2-3= Medium-high, 3-4= High) 
Legal protection of minority 
shareholders’ index 
Legal protection of minority shareholders’ index ranges between 0 and 100 
(0-30=Low, 30-50=Low-medium, 50-70= Medium-high, 70-100= High) 
Disclosure requirements’ index 
Disclosure requirements’ index ranges between 0 and 100 
(0-30=Low, 30-50=Low-medium, 50-70= Medium-high, 70-100= High) 
Shareholders’rights-One share/One vote Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if this right exists in the law and 0, otherwise  
Efficiency of judicial system 
The degree to which the judicial system of a country can guarantee compliance with laws and recommendations ranging from 0 
to 10 
(0-3=Low, 3-5=Low-medium, 5-7= Medium-high, 7-10= High) 
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Table 3 
Number of observations by activity sector 
 
TRBC economic sector name Number of observations Percentage Cum. 
Basic Materials 1,367 13.25 13.2 
Consumer Cyclicals 1,948 18.88 32.1 
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 997 9.66 41.8 
Energy 1,110 10.76 52.6 
Healthcare 825 7.99 60.6 
Industrials 2,135 20.70 81.3 
Technology 885 8.58 89.9 
Telecommunications Services 395 3.82 93.7 
Utilities 652 6.32 100.0 


























Q_TOBIN The market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book 
value of total assets 
B_SIZE The total number of directors on boards 
B_INDEP Proportion of independent directors on boards= Total number of independent on boards/ 
Total number of directors on boards 
CEO_DUALITY Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO 
and President of the board and 0, otherwise 
FEM_DIR Proportion of female directors on boards= Total number of female directors on 
boards/Total number of directors no boards 
B_COMPENSATION Log of board compensation 
B_MEETING Number of meetings held by boards every year 
SIZE The log of total assets 
LEVERAGE Debt over total assets 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY Ratio of long-term or fixed assets over total assets 
OWNSHIP_CON Average percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest 
firms in each country 
DUAL_CLASS Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if firms have dual-class stocks (class A/B or 
registered/bearer shares) and 0, otherwise 
OPERATING_PERFORM Operating performance is measured as the ratio between operating income and total assets 
BASIC MATERIALS Dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL 
Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
ENERGY Dummy variable: 1= Energy; 0 = Otherwise 
HEALTHCARE Dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise 
INDUSTRIALS Dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise 
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 
Dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise 
UTILITIES Dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = Otherwise 
AFRICA Dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Africa; 0=Otherwise 
ASIA Dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia; 0=Otherwise 
EUROPE Dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe; 0=Otherwise 
LATINAMERICA Dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Latin America; 0=Otherwise 
NORTHAMERICA Dummy variable: 1= If the country is in North America; 0=Otherwise 
























































Mean and standard deviation. Q_TOBIN is the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of 
total assets; B_SIZE is the total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards= Total 
number of independent on boards/ Total number of directors on boards; CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; FEM_DIR is the Proportion of female directors on 
boards= Total number of female directors on boards/Total number of directors no boards; B_COMPENSATION is the log of board 
compensation; B_MEETING is the number of meetings held by boards every year; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEVERAGE is debt over 
total assets; CAPITAL_INTENSITY is the ratio of long-term or fixed assets over total assets; OWNSHIP_CON is the average percentage of 
shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in each country; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if firms have dual-class stocks (class A/B or registered/bearer shares) and 0, otherwise; OPERATING_PERFORM is the ratio between 
operating income and total assets; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER 
CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= 
Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise; HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy 
variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise; TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES is a dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise and UTILITIES is a dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = 
Otherwise. AFRICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Africa; 0=Otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in 
Asia; 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe; 0=Otherwise; LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= 
If the country is in Latin America; 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in North America; 





Q_TOBIN 10314 0.57 0.20 
B_SIZE 10314 10.60 3.20 
B_INDEP 10314 63.60 26.04 
CEO_DUALITY 10314 30.00 46.00 
FEM_DIR 10314 11.90 10.73 
B_COMPENSATION 10314 13.60 1.00 
B_MEETING 10314 8.50 5.21 
SIZE 10314 9.60 1.45 
LEVERAGE 10314 13.00 24.09 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY 10314 6.40 5.99 
OWNSHIP_CON 10314 30.04 13.77 
DUAL_CLASS 10314 13.15 33.79 
OPERATING_PERFORM 10314 13.74 13.19 
BASIC MATERIALS 10314 13.25 33.90 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 10314 18.88 39.14 
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL 10314 9.66 29.55 
ENERGY 10314 10.76 30.99 
HEALTHCARE 10314 7.99 27.12 
INDUSTRIALS 10314 20.70 40.51 
TECHNOLOGY 10314 8.58 28.00 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 10314 3.82 19.19 
UTILITIES 10314 6.32 24.33 
AFRICA 10314 0.70 8.33 
ASIA 10314 15.31 36.00 
EUROPE 10314 30.70 46.12 
LATINAMERICA 10314 2.49 15.58 
NORTHAMERICA 10314 43.74 49.61 



















































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Q_TOBIN (1) 1.0000                  
B_SIZE (2) 0.178*** 1.000                 
B_INDEP (3) 0.005 -0.079*** 1.000                
CEO_DUALITY (4) 0.062*** 0.122*** 0.195*** 1.000               
FEM_DIR (5) 0.101*** 0.131*** 0.391*** 0.071*** 1.000              
B_COMPENSATION (6) 0.089*** 0.357*** 0.482*** 0.228*** 0.270*** 1.000             
B_MEETING (7) 0.053*** -0.059*** 0.069*** -0.096*** 0.068*** -0.048*** 1.000            
SIZE (8) 0.276*** 0.515*** 0.048*** 0.162*** 0.123*** 0.422*** 0.035*** 1.000           
LEVERAGE (9) 0.765*** 0.164*** -0.012 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.270*** 1.000          
CAPITAL_INTENSITY 
(10) 
-0.080*** 0.032*** -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.121*** -0.054*** 0.007 0.021** 0.006 1.000         
OWNSHIP_CON (11) -0.096*** 0.019** 0.046*** -0.133*** 0.012 -0.023** 0.008 -0.068*** -0.032*** 0.175*** 1.000        
DUAL_CLASS (12) 0.037*** 0.131*** -0.101*** -0.027* 0.069*** -0.043*** -0.042*** 0.067*** 0.029*** -0.058*** 0.110*** 1.000       
OPERATING_PERFORM 
(13) 
-0.214*** -0.015 0.142*** 0.036*** 0.072*** 0.137*** -0.066*** -0.016* -0.122*** 0.111*** 0.120*** -0.013 1.000      
BASIC MATERIALS (14) -0.128*** -0.069*** -0.002 -0.089*** -0.100*** -0.021** 0.017* -0.062*** -0.051*** 0.142*** 0.104*** -0.039*** -0.063*** 1.000     
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 
(15) 
-0.012 -0.027*** -0.068*** 0.006 0.077*** -0.038*** -0.077*** -0.094*** -0.033*** -0.095*** -0.112*** 0.100*** -0.105*** -0.188*** 1.000    
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL (16) 
0.072*** 0.089*** -0.032*** 0.003 0.122*** 0.020* -0.015 0.031** 0.066*** -0.058*** -0.009 0.058*** -0.076*** -0.127*** -0.158*** 1.000   
ENERGY (17) -0.111*** -0.007 0.073*** 0.013 -0.106*** 0.028*** 0.022** 0.090*** -0.082*** 0.308*** 0.173*** -0.053*** 0.096*** -0.135*** -0.168*** -0.113*** 1.000  
HEALTHCARE (18) -0.132*** -0.062*** 0.088*** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.089*** 0.014 -0.063*** -0.086*** -0.149*** -0.035*** -0.015 0.106*** -0.115*** -0.142*** -0.096*** -0.150*** 1.000 
INDUSTRIALS (19) 0.217*** 0.021** -0.068*** 0.013 -0.069*** -0.088*** -0.017* -0.007 0.117*** -0.177*** -0.087*** -0.011 -0.093*** -0.199*** -0.247*** -0.166*** -0.090*** -0.150*** 
TECHNOLOGY (20) -0.172*** -0.076*** 0.049*** 0.017* -0.029*** 0.051*** 0.001 -0.063*** -0.228*** -0.124*** -
0.073***** 
-0.026* 0.069*** -0.119*** -0.148*** -0.100*** -0.058*** -0.090*** 
TELECOMM SERVICES 
(21) 
0.075*** 0.075*** -0.027*** -0.015 0.025** -0.010 0.076*** 0.099*** 0.109*** 0.165*** 0.078*** 0.022** 0.091*** 0.165*** -0.096*** -0.069*** -0.076*** -0.058*** 
UTILITIES (22) 0.177*** 0.102*** 0.038*** 0.022** 0.065*** 0.023** 0.043*** 0.160*** 0.225*** 0.107*** 0.038*** -0.059*** 0.114*** -0.101*** -0.125*** -0.090*** -0.076*** -0.076*** 
AFRICA (23) -0.018* 0.043*** -0.045*** -0.058*** 0.038*** -0.037*** -0.055*** -0.023** -0.0239** 0.079*** 0.019* 0.014 0.0153 -0.019** 0.012 0.013 -0.034*** -0.034*** 
ASIA (24) -0.014 0.096*** -0.528*** -0.019** -0.379*** -0.474*** -0.048*** 0.113*** 0.033*** -0.215*** -0.077*** -0.189*** -0.012 -0.023** -0.024** -0.039*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
EUROPE (25) 0.134*** 0.027*** -0.192*** -0.229*** 0.049*** -0.052*** 0.064*** 0.032*** 0.052*** 0.142*** 0.174*** -0.011 0.001 0.009 0.002 -0.017* 0.068*** 0.068*** 
LATINAMERICA (26) -0.019* 0.005 -0.139*** -0.042*** -0.093*** -0.168*** -0.186*** 0.005 0.033*** 0.247*** -0.019* 0.066*** 0.042*** -0.032*** 0.050*** -0.033*** -0.015 -0.015 
NORTHAMERICA (27) -0.052*** 0.043*** 0.593*** 0.341*** 0.240*** 0.471*** 0.057*** 0.007 -0.063*** -0.116*** -0.050*** 0.120*** -0.065*** -0.002 0.003 0.044*** -0.094*** -0.094*** 
OCEANIA (28) -0.104*** -0.285*** 0.040*** -0.176*** 0.024** -0.036*** 0.194*** -0.229*** -0.031*** 0.0936*** -0.099*** 0.009 0.110*** 0.046*** -0.013 0.014 -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
Q_TOBIN (1)          
B_SIZE (2)          
B_INDEP (3)          
CEO_DUALITY (4)          
FEM_DIR (5)          
B_COMPENSATION (6)          
B_MEETING (7)          
SIZE (8)          
LEVERAGE (9)          
CAPITAL_INTENSITY 
(10) 
         
OWNSHIP_CON (11)          
DUAL_CLASS (12)          
OPERATING_PERFORM 
(13) 
         
BASIC MATERIALS (14)          
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 
(15) 
         
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL (16) 
         
ENERGY (17)          
HEALTHCARE (18)          
INDUSTRIALS (19) 1.000         
TECHNOLOGY (20) -0.156*** 1.000        
TELECOMM SERVICES 
(21) 
-0.102*** -0.061*** 1.000       
UTILITIES (22) -0.132*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 1.000      
AFRICA (23) 0.003 0.074*** -0.021** -0.021** 1.000     
ASIA (24) 0.038*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.032*** 1.000    
EUROPE (25) -0.05*** 0.051*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.052*** -0.282*** 1.000   
LATINAMERICA (26) -0.049*** 0.003 0.0377*** 0.037*** -0.005 -0.066*** -0.104*** 1.000  
NORTHAMERICA (27) 0.073*** -0.049*** 0.047*** 0.047*** -0.071*** -0.374*** -0.586*** -0.139*** 1.000 
OCEANIA (28) -0.077*** -0.009 -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.018* -0.116*** -0.182*** -0.041*** -0.242*** 
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Q_TOBIN is the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; B_SIZE is the total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent 
directors on boards= Total number of independent on boards/ Total number of directors on boards; CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and 
President of the board and 0, otherwise; FEM_DIR is the Proportion of female directors on boards= Total number of female directors on boards/Total number of directors no boards; B_COMPENSATION is the log of 
board compensation; B_MEETING is the number of meetings held by boards every year; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEVERAGE is debt over total assets; CAPITAL_INTENSITY is the ratio of long-term or fixed 
assets over total assets; OWNSHIP_CON is the average percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in each country; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
firms have dual-class stocks (class A/B or registered/bearer shares) and 0, otherwise; OPERATING_PERFORM is the ratio between operating income and total assets; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= 
Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = 
Otherwise; HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise; TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = 
Otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES is a dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise and UTILITIES is a dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = Otherwise. AFRICA is a dummy 
variable: 1= If the country is in Africa; 0=Otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia; 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe; 0=Otherwise; 
LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Latin America; 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in North America; 0=Otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy 





Multivariate analysis results with Q_Tobin as dependent variable 
 




















    0.004*** 
(0.000) 
B_INDEP  0.000*** 
(0.001) 
   0.000*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_DUALITY   0.026*** 
(0.000) 
  0.023*** 
(0.000) 


























































































































































































































































Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,314 10,314 10,314 10,314 10,314 10,314 
R2 19.34% 18.93% 19.13% 19.06% 18.81% 19.89% 
F test 86.21*** 83.12*** 85.81*** 83.51*** 82.96*** 78.85*** 
Q_TOBIN is the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; B_SIZE is the total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent 
directors on boards= Total number of independent on boards/ Total number of directors on boards; CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and 
President of the board and 0, otherwise; FEM_DIR is the Proportion of female directors on boards= Total number of female directors on boards/Total number of directors no boards; B_COMPENSATION is the log of 
board compensation; B_MEETING is the number of meetings held by boards every year; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEVERAGE is debt over total assets; CAPITAL_INTENSITY is the ratio of long-term or fixed 
assets over total assets; OWNSHIP_CON is the average percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in each country; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
firms have dual-class stocks (class A/B or registered/bearer shares) and 0, otherwise; OPERATING_PERFORM is the ratio between operating income and total assets; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= 
Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = 
Otherwise; HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise; TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = 
Otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES is a dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise and UTILITIES is a dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = Otherwise. AFRICA is a dummy 
variable: 1= If the country is in Africa; 0=Otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia; 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe; 0=Otherwise; 
LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Latin America; 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in North America; 0=Otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy 





























Regressions with lagged independent variables 
 




















    0.005*** 
(0.000) 
B_INDEP_1  0.000*** 
(0.000) 
   0.000*** 
(0.001) 
CEO_DUALITY_1   0.031*** 
(0.000) 
  0.027*** 
(0.000) 




























































































































































































AFRICA 0.018 0.034 0.036 0.018 0.023 0.036 
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Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8479 8479 8479 8479 8479 8479 
R2 21.64% 21.21% 21.54% 21.45% 21.09% 22.41% 
F test 78.41*** 75.64*** 78.33*** 76.35*** 75.43*** 71.76*** 
Q_TOBIN is the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; B_SIZE is the total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent 
directors on boards= Total number of independent on boards/ Total number of directors on boards; CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and 
President of the board and 0, otherwise; FEM_DIR is the Proportion of female directors on boards= Total number of female directors on boards/Total number of directors no boards; B_COMPENSATION is the log of 
board compensation; B_MEETING is the number of meetings held by boards every year; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEVERAGE is debt over total assets; CAPITAL_INTENSITY is the ratio of long-term or fixed 
assets over total assets; OWNSHIP_CON is the average percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in each country; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
firms have dual-class stocks (class A/B or registered/bearer shares) and 0, otherwise; OPERATING_PERFORM is the ratio between operating income and total assets; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= 
Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = 
Otherwise; HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise; TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = 
Otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES is a dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise and UTILITIES is a dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = Otherwise. AFRICA is a dummy 
variable: 1= If the country is in Africa; 0=Otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia; 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe; 0=Otherwise; 
LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Latin America; 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in North America; 0=Otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy 


























Multivariate analysis results with ROE as dependent variable 
 




















    0.026** 
(0.010) 
B_INDEP  0.062** 
(0.000) 
   0.0419*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_DUALITY   0.798*** 
(0.001) 
  0.705*** 
(0.005) 


























































































































































































































































Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,314 10,314 10,314 10,314 10,314 10,314 
R2 24.31% 24.79% 24.38% 25.01% 24.71% 25.69% 
F test 95.31*** 102.68*** 95.26*** 99.16*** 101.93*** 95.78*** 
ROE ratio (return on equity), measured as the ratio of net profit over total equity; B_SIZE is the total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards= Total number of 
independent on boards/ Total number of directors on boards; CEO_DUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the board and 0, otherwise; 
FEM_DIR is the Proportion of female directors on boards= Total number of female directors on boards/Total number of directors no boards; B_COMPENSATION is the log of board compensation; B_MEETING is the 
number of meetings held by boards every year; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEVERAGE is debt over total assets; CAPITAL_INTENSITY is the ratio of long-term or fixed assets over total assets; OWNSHIP_CON 
is the average percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in each country; DUAL_CLASS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if firms have dual-class stocks (class A/B or 
registered/bearer shares) and 0, otherwise; OPERATING_PERFORM is the ratio between operating income and total assets; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise; 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise; HEALTHCARE is a dummy 
variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise; TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES is a dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise and UTILITIES is a dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = Otherwise. AFRICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Africa; 
0=Otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia; 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe; 0=Otherwise; LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the 
country is in Latin America; 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in North America; 0=Otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Oceania; 0=Otherwise. 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
